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The American Invasion of Russia 
Erik Merkel 
'111e jungle is full of words 
that sound like one thing, 
but mean another. 
-Rudyard Kipling 
Wars are terrible tragedies and civil wars may be the most terrible 
of all wars, and the Russian the most terrible of those. Russia lost 
seven million lives in World War I and the revolutions preceding the 
Russian Civil War. During the course of the Civil War, countless more 
lives were lost. Possibly of more lasting importance, the principles of 
the vanquished party in a Civil War are lost seemingly forever, while 
the tenets which the victorious hold dear, become unassailable during 
their rule. 
Lenin, the Bolsheviks, and their reputation are at their nadir now, 
but no one can deny that their desperate struggle to survive and finally 
to prevail through the revolutions and the Civil War required not only 
the greatest courage, but also the autocratic control of all resources. 
The Bolsheviks were born with the greatest of idealism, but because 
they faced soldiers from all the major countries and the Russian White 
Armies, the Bolsheviks were forced to centralized control of the people. 
It is necessary to understand the Russian struggle and its violence to 
understand Stalin, the dictatorships, and the resulting loss of any 
chance to test the experiment of economic communism. 
Vladimir llich Lenin, Leon Trotsky and many others contended the 
Civil War would not have occurred, or, at least, would not have been 
so intense, long or costly except for the intervention of the United 
States and the other Allies. Ancillary to that issue is the question of 
why the Allies intervened; was it to crush the Bolsheviks as the same 
figures suggest? This paper will attempt to address these questions 
knowing that this does not provide either the depth or space the 
analysis deserves. 
American Invasion of Russia 42 
The Bolsheviks came to power on November 7, 1917. They moved 
swiftly, and the next day, a Decree of Peace was issued. On 
November 22, 1917, Lenin suggested to the Allies a general peace. 
When this brought no response, on December 3, he commenced 
negotiations of a separate armistice with Germany which were 
concluded twelve days later. The armistice was to extend for four 
weeks and to continue thereafter unless terminated by seven days 
notice by one of the parties. Ultimately, this led to the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty of March 3, 1918, which concluded hostilities between Russia 
and Germany.1 The suffering Russians were happy; the still fighting 
Allies were mad. 
As Lenin and Trotsky were concerned that Germany would not 
keep its word, they attempted to continue friendly relations with the 
Allies.2 This was not precluded by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; it was not 
an alliance. Russia continued diplomatic relations with the Allies, 
though the foreign embassies moved from Petrograd to Vologda.3 
The Russian army under Czar Nicholas had collapsed during the 
chaos of the spring and summer of 1917, leaving diplomacy as 
Russia's only defense. Finland and the Ukraine had not entered into 
treaties with Germany. They were the immediate victims of German 
invasions, placing the most developed and industrialized parts of 
Russia in the jaws of the German military machine. With diplomacy, 
Lenin and Trotsky hoped to hold Germany to its promise of peace, but 
also, to be able to call on the Allies for help in the event of renewed 
German hostilities. It was, as stated by one writer, "obvious that the 
Bolsheviks intended to carry on a policy of playing off the Germans 
against the Allies and vice versa."4 
1Leonid I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1937), 3-4; J. F. N. Bradley, Civil War in Russia 
1917-1920 (New York: St. Martin's, 1975), 51-52. The dates are based upon the present 
day calendar. 
2Strakhovsky, 12-14; The concerns about German hostilities were fueled by German 
conquests in Finland and the Ukraine which were not parties to the treaty. 
3Benjamin D. Rhodes, The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia. 1918-1919 (New 
York: Greenwood, 1988), 7-8, 23; David R. Francis, Russia From the American Embassy 
(New York: Char1es Scribner's Sons, 1921), 261-62; Frederick Lewis Schuman, American 
Policy Toward Russia Since 1917 (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion, 1928), 85-86, 99-
100. A beautifully written description of Archangel and its history appear in John Cudahy, 
Archangel: The American War With Russia (Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1924), 41, 47. The 
move to Vologda was triggered by Germany's invasion of Finland which placed the 
German front within twenty-five miles of Petrograd. Strakhovsky, 17. 
4Strakhovsky, 10-23. 
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The position of Russia in this period of time is well stated by 
Edmond Taylor in his The Fall of The Dynasties: 
[T]o the peace of Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia became for the time being a 
hostage of Imperial Germany. The Bolshevik power could only survive as 
long as the German Army was willing to see it survive. A policy of 
cooperation, almost of partnership, with Germany was therefore a vital 
necessity from the short-term viewpoint; from the long-term viewpoint 
discreet preparations for renewing the struggle against the oppressor, 
possibly with Allied he!f>, and for throwing off the chains of Brest-Litovsk 
were no less essential. 
Trotsky said "We were between hammer and anvil."6 
As much as the Russians needed the potential help of the Allies, 
the Allies needed an eastern front even more. The prophetic words of 
Winston Churchill were: 
Above all things reconstitute the fighting front in the East ... If we cannot 
reconstitute the fighting front against Germany in the East no end can be 
discerned to the war. Vain will be all the sacrifices of the peoples and the 
armies. They will tend only to prolong the conflict into depths which 
cannot be climbed. We must not take "No" for an answer either from 
America or from Japan. We must compel events instead of acquiescing in 
the drift.7 
The French ambassador to Russia stated: "The capital problem was 
that of reconstituting an Eastern front."8 Though new to the war, the 
United States also recognized the importance of the eastern front.9 
The first American troops landed six days after the signing of the 
Brest-Litovsk treaty on March 9, 1918, in Archangel. Soon there were 
35,000 Allied troops on shore which alarmed not only Germany but 
5Edmond Taylor, The Fall of the Dynasties (New York: Dorset, 1963), 310. 
6Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), 395. 
7Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. ii (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1927), 191. 
Emphasis has been added. 
8Strakhovsky, 18. 
9Francis, 229-260; George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied lnteivention in 
South Russia. 1917-1921 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966),53-55; 
Louis de Robien, The Diarv of a Diplomat in Russia. 1917-1918, trans. Camilla Sykes 
(New York: Praeger, 1967), 263-64. 
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also the Bolsheviks. When the local Russian leader, A. M. Yuriev, 
refused to order the Allies to leave, the Bolsheviks declared Yuriev an 
enemy. With that, Yuriev and his troops became a part of the White 
Army cooperating with the Allies.10 This was not the only White Army. 
In the east Japanese troops with White forces later pushed westward 
along the Trans-Siberian railroad; but the strongest White Army was in 
the south in Cossack country. 
The first real military leadership opposing the Bolsheviks came 
from General Mikhail Alekseev, the imperial chief of staff under Czar 
Nicholas. When the Bolsheviks came to power, Alekseev was sixty 
years old, diagnosed with cancer, and had only eleven months to live. 
With his last energies, he formed the strongest White army based on 
the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains. On his death, 
Alekseev was followed by Kornilov, then by Krasnov, Denikin, and 
finally Kolchak. Already strong in May 1918, the White army united 
with 40,000 Czech troops who had deserted from the Austrian armies. 
They had also fought against Germany with the Czar's army and since 
the coup, had been stranded in the Ukraine. Other Czech troops had 
reached Vladiostok earlier, where they were waiting for troop ships to 
return them home. With their presence, the Czechs became a factor 
in the eastern intervention. Some Czech troops were sent north by the 
French to Archangel for transport home which caused the Bolsheviks 
to fear and suspect that they were a part of a plot to overthrow the 
government. In any event, because of this and other incidents, the 
remaining Czechs felt they would have to fight their way out and the 
best way to do this was to unite with the White forces. United with the 
Czechs, the White army pushed northward with great success and 
rapidity. This resulted in two consequences. 11 
The apparent strength of this drive persuaded the Allies to help all 
White forces with badly needed armament and supplies, as well as 
credit for purchases. This stalled any quick resolution of the Civil War, 
10Strakhovsky, 65-70; Schuman, 108-137; Rhodes, 34; Francis, 264; a detailed 
description of this war in the north from a military viewpoint appears in Joel R. Moore, The 
History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviks, Capt. Joel R. Moore, Lieut. 
Harry H. Mead, & Lieut. Lewis E. Jahns, comp. and ed. (Detroit: Polar Bear Publishing, 
1920). The United States troops were commanded by General F. Poole initially and then 
by General Edward M. Ironside. See Rhodes, , 45-48. 
11 Bruce W. Lincoln, Red Victory (New Yori<: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 72-97; Taylor, 
310-17; Schuman, , 92-95; Bradley ,60-67. 
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and enabled the White forces to do battle on more equal terms. The 
Reds had more men, but now the Whites had superior firepower. 12 
The other consequence of this northward drive was the death of the 
imperial family. By now, the Czar and his family had been moved from 
Tobolsk to Ekaterinburg which was in the direct line of this advance. 
Obviously their rescue could not be allowed. "The ordeal of the 
Romanovs must have been all the harder on their nerves because 
rescue was so near at hand; yet the nearer it approached the more 
deadly became their peril."13 On July 16, 1918, their ordeal ended in 
execution. The White Army took the city nine days later.14 
Meanwhile, the Civil War was heating up in the far east at 
Vladivostok. This was the major Russian port in the Far East on the 
Sea of Japan. Vladivostok was linked to Moscow and the rest of 
Russia by the Trans-Siberian Railroad. With the German army cutting 
across Europe north to south there were two entrances into Russia--
Archangel and Murmansk, ports which were frozen over in the winter. 
Vladivostok would have been very valuable, but the cargo landed there 
would have to be transported by the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Thus, 
Vladivostok became the focal point of the eastern battles of the Civil 
War. Actually, however, the major battles started in the western part of 
Siberia, west of the Urals on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and moved 
east to Vladivostok along the Railroad. For this reason, these battles 
came to be known as the Siberian battles, or by the United States, as 
the Siberian Expedition. 
On the outbreak of World War I, Russia recruited for its army less 
than a thousand Czechs and Slovaks who had settled in Russia years 
before. This Czech brigade fought bravely with significant publicity and 
became the object of pride among Czech nationalists, led by Eduard 
Benes and Toma Masaryk, who were seeking an independent 
Czechoslovakia, and separation from the Hapsburg Empire. As the war 
progressed, Russia in its victories against Austria, captured several 
hundred thousand Czech and Slovak prisoners but the government 
12Uncoln, 198-99, 213. The AHies delivered to each of the three main White annies 
1000 field guns, 250,000 rifles, 7,000 machine guns, and millions of rounds of ammunition. 
Grove C. Haines & Ross J. S. Hoffman, Origins and Background of the Second Wor1d War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 112-114, 76; "The American Government's 
Policy," Current Historv: Volume )()(XII. April-September. 1930 (New York: The New York 
Times, 1930), 59-64; Bradley, 56-58; William S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure 
(New York: Jonathan Cape & Hamson Smith, 1931), 20-21, 99. 
13raylor, 314. 
141bid., 315-16. 
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would not use them since they might represent a large dissident 
nationalist force. After the March revolution, Kerensky asked for 
volunteers from these prisoners. The Czech brigade immediately 
became a Czech army of 100,000, and fought well until the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty. Those that originally came from Russia stayed. Others sneaked 
back through the lines to home. Others had been captured and more 
were casualties so that after the treaty there were about 55,000 to 
60,000 Czech troops stranded in the Ukraine. Masaryk wanted them 
transported out to fight on the western front. The Germans wanted them 
back as prisoners to be exchanged under the treaty. The Allies wanted 
them to fight the Reds one way or the other. The Reds were distrustful 
of them and thought they were pawns of the Allies. The Czechs 
themselves probably just wanted to go home, at least initially. In any 
event there was no way out except with Red approval. 
In March 1918, Masaryk and Lenin negotiated an agreement of 
safe passage by the Trans-Siberian Railroad and Vladivostok but the 
Czechs would have to first surrender all of their weapons. By May, 
approximately 10,000 Czechs had reached Vladivostok and were 
waiting on ships tor passage home.15 Then on May 25, the Czechs 
intercepted a telegram from Trotsky directing the shooting on the spot of 
any Czech with a weapon. This convinced them that they had been 
betrayed and the stranded 40,000 joined the White forces to fight their 
way to the 10,000 comrades already at Vladivostok.16 
Just as in the case in the south, the fortunes of the White forces in 
the east were largely dependent on the stranded 40,000 Czechs. The 
French had pressured the Czechs into trying to escape by way of 
Archangel, probably knowing that this way was blocked by the Reds 
and that battles between the Reds and Czechs would ensue, which 
they did. This left Vladivostok as the only outlet. 
By this time, the Reds had secured the railroad and most of 
Siberia. Raymond Robins, director of the American Red Cross, had 
traveled from Vologda to Vladivostok without any incident, as had the 
personnel of the YMCA. "Siberia was completely under Soviet control 
and at peace."17 This was about to change. 
15Lincoln, 93-97; Rhodes, 3-4; George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin 
and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), 97-107; Graves, 38; Betty Miller Unterberger, 
America's Siberian Expedition. 1918-1920 (New York: Greenwood, 1969), 55; Edward T. 
Heald, Witness to Revolution, Ed. James B Gidney (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University 
Press, 1972), 211 ; The number of Czechs at Vladivostok is cited as being 8,000, 10,000, 
or 12,000, and the number stranded as being 35,000, 40,000, 45,000, or 60,000 depending 
on the source. Several sources confuse the origin of this Czech force and more ignore the 
problem. The story is quite interesting. 
16Lincoln, 92-94. 
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In the latter part of May 1918, there were approximately 20,000 
Czechs in trains scattered along the Railroad from Kazan, on the Volga 
west of the Urals, to Irkutsk, just west of Lake Baikal, a distance of 
3,000 miles. In spite of their agreement not to carry weapons~ the well 
armed Czechs were actually the strongest force in this area. 8 There 
were disagreements and minor skirmishes all along the line, but on 
the night of May 25, a skirmish broke out that killed ten and wounded 
ten others. Another skirmish resulted in ten dead Czechs, which 
brought about the end of peace and the beginning of the Siberian 
battles. A group of Czechs with thirty carbines and some grenades 
were ordered to surrender their armaments within fifteen minutes. 
They did not, but engaged in conversation. At the end of the fifteen 
minutes, without further warning, the Reds machine-gunned the 
Czechs. The Czechs fought back, and though they had fewer 
weapons, the Czechs greatly out numbered the Reds. In a fierce fight, 
mostly hand to hand, the Czechs prevailed. From this point on, the 
Czechs fought, killed, and captured Reds and weapons until they were 
victorious. There was no longer peace, just bloody fighting.19 
Meanwhile in Vladivostok there was turmoil. On April 3, 1918, 
several Japanese civilians were killed in a street brawl, apparently by 
Red soldiers. This provided Japan with an excuse to land a few 
soldiers to protect its citizens. On the same pretext so did England, 
but England was really more concerned about the territorial ambitions 
of Japan than about the safety of any civilians. In the spring of 1918, 
confronting about 100 Red soldiers, there were approximately 20,000 
Japanese, English, and Czech soldiers, all eagerly looking for a pretext 
to start a fight. The Czechs provoked skirmishes from May 18 to June 
29, 1918, when the Czechs overthrew the Reds and took over the city. 
Now with Vladivostok in their possession, the Czechs started moving 
along the railroad toward their brothers who were fighting eastward 
from Irkutsk. By early July, the Czechs and Whites had complete 
control of the Railroad from west of Omsk to Vladivostok.20 
17Schuman, 90. Heald, 211-225. 
18Kennan, 97-98; George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia (New York: Macmillan, 
1933), 105-106; Bradley, 82-92. 
19 John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1950), 92-93; Lincoln, 94-97; Stewart, 105-118. 
20Schuman, 92-93; Bradley, 92-96; Kennan, 98-107; Graves, America's Siberian 
Adventure. 38; Unterberger, 39, 55-59. 
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The Reds believed the Allies had incited the Czech uprising. Since 
the Czechs controlled the railroad and the port, there was no longer 
anything to prevent them from leaving. Because they stayed and 
fought, the Reds suspected collusion between the Allies and the 
Czechs. There is substantial evidence that France and England had 
ulterior motives, but little to implicate the United States. In any event 
the Allies, including the United States, were happy with the end 
result.21 · 
After the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Allies debated on whether to 
intervene in Siberia. Intervention at Vladivostok and in Siberia called 
tor mediation, at least, in the United States. The French and the 
English, however were, from the very beginning, clearly and strongly 
for intervention, not only as a force against Germany, but to wipe out 
Bolshevism. Japan was in Javor of intervention for the same reasons; 
additionally, they secretly hoped to incorporate Vladivostok, the 
offshore islands, and far eastern Russia into Japanese territory.22 
President Woodrow Wilson was generally opposed to intervention. 
Initially he stated that the United States would not intervene because it 
would constitute interference in the domestic affairs of another country, 
which was contrary to his proposal for peace known as "The Fourteen 
Points." Throughout the debate and even after his decision to 
intervene, Wilson stuck to this philosophical principle.23 However, what 
was right and what was politic or even possible were two different 
matters. 
The pressure on the president to change his mind was tremendous. 
First, there was a supposition among American leaders that the Red 
government was only temporary. After all, the Kerensky government 
21 Kennan, 98·103; Stewart, 113·114; Victor Serge, Memojrs of a Revolutionary. 1901· 
1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 87·88; Alexander F. Kerensky, I!m 
Crucifixion of Liberty. Trans. G Kerensky (London: Arthur Barker, 1934), 299·302; 
Alexander F. Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point (New York: Duell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1965), 498-504. Kerensky had unsuccessfully attempted to secure financial aid 
from the Allies and was told by Albert Thomas, a French minister that the Allies had 
decided to divide up Russia after the war. Kerensky, ~ 504. The French continually 
favorad intervention and, as previously discussed, had pushed a Czech group to start the 
fighting in the south; England was more discreet but very liberal with money and supplies 
giving the Czechs over 13 million dollars. Kennan, 94·95 and 115-116; Graves, 99; 
Stewart, 113-114; Schuman, 114-15, 145. 
22Graves, 20-27, 64-65, 69; Kannan, 94-95; Schuman, 116-119, 145; Kerensky, 
~. 498-504; Kerensky, Crucifixion, 312; de Robien, 149·150, 263-264; Brinkley, 53· 
55; Moore, 47-48. 
23Schuman, 82-83; Kennan, 94-95, 117-118; Unterberger, 19·38. 
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did not last a year, and Lenin's was believed to have even less public 
support. Soon there would probably be a moderate White government, 
and the United States could wait until then to do business with Russia. 
In the meanwhile, the United States should support the Allies and fight 
Germany.24 
There was no doubt as to what the Allies wanted. They wanted 
United States troops to fight along with the Whites to drive the Reds 
out and to hold some German troops along the eastern front. All of 
their troops were in trenches along the western front and no more 
could be spared. The leaders of France, particularly, and England 
were afraid that communism would spread to their countries. They 
sent delegation after delegation to see the president. Primarily, they 
argued that intervention was necessary to win the war against 
Germany. In addition, Russia's position that it would not pay the czar's 
debts, suspicion of an alliance between the Reds and Germany, 
Trotsky's publishing of secret treaties between the czar and the Allies, 
and the presumed atrocities of the Reds, all strengthened the 
argument to intervene. The President listened to each delegation and 
consistently said "No".25 
Pressure to intervene from within the United States was even 
stronger and more difficult to ignore than that from foreign powers. 
There was a real fear of Bolshevism, a fear played upon by a variety of 
those wanting intervention E. H. Harriman and J. J. Hill, railroad 
magnates in the United States, wanted the Trans-Siberian Railroad as 
a part of their around the world railroad network, and saw no chance of 
that with communism. International Harvester Company, J. M. Coates 
Company, Singer Sewing Machine Company, and many other United 
States companies in Russia wanted to avoid nationalization of their 
plants. They all brought a great deal of pressure to bear directly on the 
president, but more important!~ pressure came indirectly through the 
Congress and the newspapers. 6 It was the zenith of yellow journalism 
24Schuman, 50-51; Bernard Pares, My Russian Memoirs (New York: Arns, 1969), 
589; Strakovsky, 100-1; "The American Government's Policy," 59-64. 
25Schuman, 56-60, 66; Haines & Hoffman, 111-14; Kennan, 78-79; Graves, 22-27; 
Unterberger, 61-69. A British general expressed the typical Allied attitude toward the Reds 
in saying 'There will be no faltering in our purpose to remove the stain of Bolshevism from 
Russia and civilization.• Cudahy, 37. Lord Milner of England said if the Allies withdraw 
'barbarism will reign throughout.' Schuman, 121. "The Allied Powers themselves still 
viewed the intervention as a part of the war against Germany and her Allies, but the 
Bolsheviks were now definitely considered one of the latter.• Brinkley, 56. 
26White, 128-129. E. H. Harriman was the father of William Averell Harriman who 
would become ambassador to Russia in the 1940's. 
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and vitriolic speeches in Congress. There were news stories and 
speeches discussing the Reds shooting all prisoners, castrating them, 
disemboweling them, burning them either before or after they had been 
killed, raping women7 killing children, free love, and all other imaginable atrocities.2 Roger E. Simmon of the Department of 
Commerce testified of "blood-curdling tales of butchery and horror," 
and stated that a United States withdrawal "would mean the murder of 
every man, woman, and child in the evacuated territory. u Senator 
Mccumber wanted to save the Russian peasants from the "grasp of 
these damnable beasts", and declared that "the civilization of the world 
demands the extermination of such beasts." The newspapers utilized 
just as inflammatory and sensationalist vocabulary. Even the staid 
Times on November 1, 1918, called the Reds "ravening beasts of prey, 
a large part of them actual criminals, all of them mad with the raging 
passions of the class struggle. 1128 
The decision for the American intervention was difficult for 
President Wilson . He asked his ambassador to Russia, David Francis 
for his advice. Francis was a rich grain merchant and politician from 
Missouri, who later became its governor. Without the restraint of his 
wife, left in Missouri, Francis showed more interest in his mistress than 
the world crisis about him. He adored the czar and his bountiful 
hospitality and hated Bolshevism in general, and Lenin and Trotsky in 
particular.29 Francis pleaded for intervention time after time, even after 
the Civil War was over.30 On the other side of the debate, Raymond 
Robins of the Red Cross, Jacques Sadour, a French military attache, 
27Unterberger, 19-38, 61-69; Schuman, 100, 151-64. 
28 Schuman, 125, 123, 154. 
29Rhodes, 6-8, 30; Shuman, 98, 127; Unterberger, 47; Strakhovsky, , 41; Kerensky, 
Russia, 498; When advised of Lenin becoming premier and Trotsky minister of foreign 
affairs, Francis said: •disgustingl--but I hope such effort will be made as the more 
ridiculous the situation the sooner the remedy." Shuman, 56. In memoirs Francis clearly 
and continually reflects his hatred and jingoistic attitude toward the Reds. Francis: •rhe 
Bolsheviks are inhuman brutes,'(283),"my policy of exterminating Bolshevism,"(337), and 
"to eradicate this foul monster--Bolshevism--branch. trunk, and root . . . . If we would save 
society from Barbarism and humanity from slaughter."(349) Francis states: "The situation 
might have been saved had President Wilson permitted me to return to Petrograd 
accompanied by 50,000 troops, but he doubtless felt that some antidote to Bolshevism 
would be found by the Peace Conference."(348) 
This was after the Reds had already driven out the Czechs with 60,000 troops. Britain with 
6,000, Japan with over 70,000, France with 1,500, the United States with 12,000 and the 
Whites with uncountable numbers. 
3
°Francis, 283-348. 
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Bruce Lockhart, England's vice-consul in Russia, and others believed 
that by diplomacy, the Reds could have been persuaded to become 
Allies, and the Allies by riding the Whites were picking the wrong 
horse.31 Their reasoning was lost in the shouting of the anti-Reds. 
In a political world, President Wilson had to find a way to intervene 
without breaking his fourteen points, and once again the Czechs were 
the key. Wilson sympathized with small countries and oppressed 
peoples such as the Czechs, and on July 5, 1918, while refusing to 
help form an eastern front, saying it was impossible, he decided to 
intervene with the Japanese to protect the Czechs. Marines from 
United States ships landed immediately to help protect Czechs in 
Vladivostok. By the end of September, General William Graves led 
7,000 troops which, with the help of an equal number of Japanese was 
intended to cover the expected Czech evacuation. By that time, 
however, the Czechs constituted the strongest force in the area and 
had complete control of the railroad and Vladivostok. They had no 
intention of leaving.32 
Upon landing in Vladivostok, the United States troops had little to 
do. The Czechs had already done it. The United States assumed 
some administrative duties from the Czechs in Vladivostok and the 
guarding and maintaining of the railroad, which released the Czechs to 
fight Reds in the field. The United States troops engaged in only one 
minor skirmish with the Reds. Because the United States was not 
actively attacking the Red army, they perceived themselves as neutral, 
only being present to protect the Czechs. However, because the 
United States had released the Czechs from guard duty, freeing 
40,000 to 60,000 troops to aid the Whites, the Reds recognized the 
United States intervention as an act of aggression.33 
From the summer of 1918 to the summer of 1919, the White forces 
under the military leadership of Denikin, an old czarist general, and 
Wrangel in the west, and the Czechs and Whites under Kolchak in the 
east, had their greatest successes. In the west Denikin was rolling 
northward towards the new capital of the Reds, Moscow, taking Kiev, 
Kursk, Orel, and Kharkov. They were within two hundred miles of the 
Kremlin towers. In the north, the Whites were within thirty miles of 
31 Schuman, 90; Kennan, 60. Kennan claims diplomacy would not have bean 
successful. 
32Kennan, 98-108; Graves, 38, 55, 66, 79; Uterbergar, 60, 69-89, 99; Schuman, 114, 
98; Stewart, 140. The aide memoir issued by Wilson authorizing the intervention stated: 
"Military action is admissible in Russia ... only to help the Czech-Slovaks.• Graves, 7. 
33Kennan, 107, 108-10; Schuman, 135-45; Graves,, 55-99,180·90. 
American Invasion of Russia 52 
Petrogad. In the east Kolchak had control of Siberia and was pushing 
west from Kazan towards Novgorod and Moscow. In October 1919, 
and the Allied diplomats and newspapers were declaring victory. This 
was the high point; they would go no further.34 It was at this point that 
the Red Army turned the tide. 
In the meantime, an armistice with Germany was declared on 
November 11, 1918. The war with Germany was over, and there was 
no longer a need for an eastern front, but the Allied intervention 
continued. As Trotsky stated: "During the course of the year 1918 the 
Allies were forcing a Civil War on us, supposedly in the interest of 
victory over the Kaiser. But now it was 1919. Germany had long since 
been defeated. Yet the Allies continued to spend hundreds of millions 
to spread death, famine, and disease in the country of revolution."35 
With the armistice, the original excuse for intervention had passed, but 
the directive to the military was to continue, though many questioned 
its legitimacy. It was as though nothing had happened.36 
The Allies continued fighting and furnishing supplies to those in 
opposition. The British asked Kolchak to become dictator of the 
Whites, with his capital in Omsk. The French recognized his 
leadership. The United States did not, but helped to supply him. 
Private groups in the United States raised money for the Whites. The 
YMCA provided the Whites with supplies and services. United States 
troops still guarded the Railroad.37 Nothing had changed except the 
expressed excuses; now it was, as British General Maynard clearly 
stated, "to throttle in its infancy the noisome beast of Bolshevism. "38 
Stories of atrocities continued to fuel the hatred toward the 
Reds. As in all wars, the atrocities of Civil Wars seem to be the most 
bitter, but the Whites certainly rivaled the Reds in brutality. Kolchak in 
the east committed unspeakable atrocities. He bragged about burning 
prisoners alive, left prisoners hanging from trees so they could be seen 
from trains on the Railroad, ordered the immediate execution of all 
prisoners, jammed prisoners in box cars without adequate food, water, 
or clothes for the cold so that 800 died out of one trainload of 2, 100, 
34Stewart, 154-85, 239-80; Unterberger, 118-27; Taylor, 310-17; Serge, 90. 
35Trotsky, 425. 
36Brinkley, 75; Unterberger, 103-5, 135. 
37Unterberger, 118-27, 161-65; Graves, 99; Schuman, 118-19, 145, 157; Heald, 226-
31; Stewart, 239-51. 
38Stewart, 206. 
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purged dissidents in his own staff and army, massacred entire villages, 
tortured women, and killed rather than helped wounded prisoners. His 
partner, Semeonoff, robbed $500,000 in furs, murdered three United 
States soldiers, established •killing fields" where villagers and 
prisoners after digging their own mass graves were executed, and said 
he "couldn't sleep unless he had killed someone that day." Yet, 
despite his unarguably criminal past, he was admitted into the United 
States in 1922. Nearly every writer says something of the brutality of 
Kolchak and Semeonoff and their White forces. Even United States 
Officers ordered their troops to shoot prisoners, probably because the 
they had heard exaggerated stories about Red atrocities.39 The 
ultimate sacrifice came too often.: "every day I hear the roll of drums 
beating time for the march of a guard of ho nor and announcing a grim 
ceremony." Before the Allies left they had suffered over 2,485 
casualties.40 No one knows how many were suffered by the Russians, 
both White and Red. 
After the 1918 armistice, the Reds attempted unsuccessfully to 
engage the Allies in peace talks. The French and English wanted to 
continue to fight, but the mood in the United States was changing with 
the surge of isolationism. In response to some pressure to end the 
allied intervention, President Wilson on February 18, 1919, delegated 
William Bullitt to negotiate a proposed peace with Russia. Bullitt came 
back and advised the president that United States troops were not 
serving any useful purpose and stood in danger of being destroyed by 
the Reds. He recommended that they be withdrawn. He also brought 
back a peace proposal from the Reds which was nearly identical to an 
earlier British proposal that had not been made public, but had been 
discussed among the Allies. 
Since the Red proposal was more favorable to the Allies than the 
British proposal, Bullitt assumed it would lead to an immediate peace, 
particularly in view of his other observations of social and political 
stabilization. Amazingly no action was taken and the Allies let the 
peace proposal die. Since it was so close to the British proposal 
discussed by the Allies, it was apparent the Allies expected the British 
39Semeonoff quoted in Graves, 241, 313; Lincoln, 85-87; Trotsky, 431-2; Rhodes, 72-
74; Current History. 64-70; Serge, 83; Heald, 327; Schuman, 166·8; Heald, 248·54; 
Bradley, 104-?; Graves, 125·?, 287, 284, 315, 150-64, 146-150; Unterberger, 118-27; 
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40 de Robien, 298; Cudahy, 211. 
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proposal, if issued, to be rejected by the Reds and that the Allies really 
had no interest in peace. In disgust, Bullitt resigned May 17, 1919.41 
While the Allies were losing this opportunity for peace, they were 
also losing the war. The Czechs were becoming disillusioned with 
Kolchak and his brutality and, following the armistice, they were 
beginning to question whether anything more could be gained by their 
continuing to fight. Most of the Czechs quit on December 18, 1918, 
and in many cases revolted against the Whites. Without Czech 
support, Kolchak and the Whites immediately collapsed. The last act 
of the Czechs in Russia was to turn Kolchak over to be executed. 
They left starting on January 20, 1919, and by that time, the Reds had 
recovered nearly all of Siberia.42 
The Civil War in the north ended with the evacuation of the Allies in 
the summer of 1919. After the armistice, the Allies got as far as 
Plesetskaya, but after that, they were pushed back on all fronts to 
defensive positions. On July 29, 1919, the decision was made to 
withdraw. The evacuation was completed September 27, 1919. 
United States troops had left Northern Siberia earlier in May and June 
with the British calling them "quitters".43 
For the United States, at least, it appeared that the war should have 
been over, but they stayed in eastern Siberia. Was it to continue the 
fight against the Reds, or something else? Graves, as general of the 
United States troops, suspected it was to aid the fight against the 
Reds. When the United States went into Siberia, they brought the 
Japanese with them. The Japanese had hoped to annex Vladivostok 
and the far east Siberia. The United States probably stayed in Siberia 
not to fight the Reds, but to control Japanese ambitions. They could 
not publicly state the reason because Japan was presumably an ally. 
Since no reason was given for staying, it was assumed to be a 
continuation of the anti-Red campaign. Out of fear of being overtaken 
by the Reds, the United States withdrew its troops from Vladivostok on 
April 1, 1920, nearly one and one-half years after the armistice. On 
41 For the section regarding the Bullitt mission and report I have relied upon Haines and 
Hoffman, 111-14; Bradley, 55; Schuman, 131-35; Bullitt, The Bullitt Mission to Russia (New 
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October 26, 1922, the Japanese left. On the same day, the Reds 
occupied Vladivostok. The allied intervention was over.44 
The causes of the losses by the Whites and Allies were many. 
Surprisingly the Reds were much better administrators than the Whites 
though the Whites had all of the experienced administrators. The 
Reds had better military control. The Red soldiers executed orders 
more loyally and quickly. The Reds had the shorter interior lines. The 
Allies not only had the exterior lines, but long supply lines. Trotsky, 
with no military experience, turned out to be the war's best general, 
maybe because he had the best mind. The Whites and the Allies were 
like most coalitions--different agendas, too many egos, too many 
different supporters to satisfy, and suspicions leading to divisiveness 
and lack of unity; the Reds had none of these problems. Morale 
deteriorated among the Allies, particularly after the armistice. They 
had no common goals, unlike the Reds who were fighting for their 
motherland and fervently held principles. The atrocities of the Whites 
committed by the likes of Kolchak soured many on the war and turned 
them to the Reds. These were all reasons for the Red victory but not 
the main reason. The major reason was the overwhelming support of 
the Russian peoples. Many peasants joined the Reds because of their 
land reforms, and because the Whites kept the old czarist generals 
who had treated them so badly in prior wars. France had committed 
atrocities against not only the Russian peasants, but even the Whites. 
The English were nearly as bad, treating many White soldiers as 
taborers. This caused many White soldiers of the lower classes to 
decide they had been deceived, and they deserted to the Red army. 
Regardless of the propaganda to the contrary, there was virtual 
unanimous support for the Reds among the masses particularly after 
the Allied intervention.45 Support of the people was important, and the 
44Unterberger, 99, 176-230; Schuman, 171; Graves, 243-348; Bradley, 115-16. The 
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Reds had it in part because the Allies pushed the people in that 
direction. 
In the United States, after it was over, there was much analysis by 
the public that co•Jld be summed up with the following popular ditty: 
"some might have liked us more if we had intervened less, that some 
might have disliked us less if we had intervened more, but that, having 
concluded that we intended to intervene no more nor no less than we 
actually did, nobody had any use for us at all."46 Ambassador Francis 
wanted to go back in and exterminate the Reds with 50,000 troops.47 
Because reason prevailed over passion, this position lost support, 
except for a hard core that remains to this day. The issue became 
whether there should have even been invasions, and the consensus is, 
that there should not have been. The invasions prolonged the Civil 
War and assured an ultimate Red victory. The intervention spread 
ruin, famine, and disease across the country, killed, injured, and 
destroyed many, left the Russians suspicious and angry at the Allies, 
and provoked the founding of a Russian military dictatorship. Instead 
of a constant ally, the United States raised an enemy, costing 
casualties in confrontations throughout the world, and hundreds of 
billions of dollars. 
Was the United States there by invitation? Only in Archangel can 
that be argued. If so, the United States was the proverbial guest who 
was invited to dinner and stayed. Later "such action could no longer 
be based upon even a tacit agreement with the Bolsheviks, either 
locally or at the center, but on the contrary involved overthrowing local 
Bolshevik authority and ignoring the protests of the Soviet 
government. "48 It is nonsense to suggest that because an intruder 
was initially invited into a home, he is to be excused for sacking the 
home and trying to kick the owner out of the home while killing the 
owner's family and friends. Was it intervention or invasion? It probably 
doesn't matter. The United States landed armed troops in Russia and 
killed Russians. It fought against the Reds, who constituted the de 
facto government of Russia. No effort was made to intervene between 
or reconcile the Reds with the Whites. 
The American expedition to Siberia thus failed as completely and 
ingloriously as the force sent to Archangel to achieve the purpose for 
46Unterberger, 183, quoting from the Literarv Digest, LXll (Sept. 6, 1919), 60. 
47Graves, 348. 
48Brinkley, 56. 
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which it was intended . . . Russia had been invaded, blockaded and 
disrupted with subsidized civil strife that wrought ruin and destruction to 
her cities and farms and carried suffering and death to thousands of her 
people . . . more complete and tragic debacle would be difficult to 
. . 49 imagine. 
From the British viewpoint, it was later described as "a blunder 
comparable with the worst mistakes of the Crimean War."50 
George F. Kennan is one of the foremost students of Russia. 
About the invasion he said: 
These ventures, without exception, were serious mistakes. They reflected 
no credit on the governments that sent them. The impression they made in 
Russia was deplorable. Until I read the accounts of what transpired during 
these episodes, I never fully realized the reasons for the contempt and 
resentment borne by the early Bolsheviki toward the Western powers. 
Never, surely, have countries contrived to show themselves so much at 
their worst as did the Allies in Russia from 1917 to 1920. Among other 
things, their efforts served everywhere to compromise the enemies of the 
Bolsheviki and to strengthen the Communists themselves. So important 
was this factor that I think it may well be questioned whether Bolshevism 
would ever have ever prevailed throughout Russia had the Western 
governments not aided its progress to power by this ill-conceived 
interference. 51 
It might be that the last word should be left with Kennan, but an 
observation is warranted. One reason for studying history is to learn 
from the mistakes it discloses. Yet, less than fifty years after the 
United States' debacle in Russia, it invaded Vietnam ignoring again the 
desires, principles, and nationalism of the peoples being invaded, 
seeking instead to save the village by destroying it. The Vietnam 
experience is what the United States remembers today when it 
considers involvement in another country's problems. But the first 
such experience arose from the United States' tragic invasion of 
Russia, now all but forgotten. One can only hope that those lessons 
learned in Russia, and taught again in Vietnam, will be longer 
remembered. 
49Schuman, 171. 
50Rhodes, 123. 
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